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Measuring competing explanations of human resource management practices: cultural 
versus institutional explanations 
Mick Brookes, Richard Croucher, Mark Fenton-O'Creevy and Paul Gooderham 
(forthcoming in Human Resource Management Review) 
 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the relative and joint impact of cultural and institutional factors on firms‟ 
use of “calculative” human resource management practices to determine their separate 
analytic power. To what extent do institutions and culture structure managerial choice? 
Previous research has been constrained by not having measures for both cultural and 
institutional distance. Employing data from 14 European countries our findings indicate that 
institutional, and more specifically, labour relations factors, have more explanatory power 
than cultural factors.   
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Measuring competing explanations of human resource management practices: cultural 
versus institutional explanations 
Introduction  
A core issue in international human resource management (HRM) has been to account 
for cross-national variations in HRM regimes. A number of frameworks have been proposed 
including those of Gronhaug and Nordhaug (1992), Jackson and Schuler (1995) and Budhwar 
and Sparrow (2002). In general their common feature is to propose a distinction between 
cultural and institutional factors.  However, hitherto it has not been possible to assess the 
relative importance of these two sets of factors. This is because while cultural distance has 
been operationalized and thereafter “widely used” (Shenkar, 2001:519), until recently there 
has been no equivalent measure of institutional distance. As a consequence, some researchers 
have even employed country as a composite measure of both cultural and institutional factors 
(e.g. Fey Morgulis-Yakushev, Park and Björkman (2009); Gooderham, Nordhaug, and 
Ringdal (1999)).   
Using a recently developed measure of institutional distance (Hall and Gingerich, 
2004a) and an established and extensively used measure of cultural distance (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988), the aim of this paper is to assess the relative and joint significance of both 
cultural and institutional factors in shaping the HRM practices that private-sector firms adopt 
in different national contexts.  The issue is important for the way that it provides insight into 
the relative and joint utility of these two widely applied modes of analysis.  The question we 
pose is how useful the two paradigms are when taken together at the organizational level in 
regard   to their impact on adoption of a particular set of “calculative”, HRM practices 
(Gooderham et al., 1999). 
While acknowledging fundamental criticisms of both schools of thought, since they 
are widely used frameworks we take both the institutionalist and culturalist cases at face 
value and empirically test their respective contributions in explaining the adoption of 
calculative HRM. Culture refers to deep-seated norms and values derived from secular 
historical processes that are “programmed” into the minds of actors (Hofstede, 1991). 
Institutions refer to more recently negotiated (in historical terms) legal frameworks and 
systems of industrial relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  Cultural and institutions differ in 
two important ways. First, culture is considerably less tangible than institutions and second, 
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while institutions are regularly transformed and modified (Hall and Thelen, 2009), culture is 
considered to be more persistent over time (Hofstede, 1980).  The essence of the two 
perspectives may be captured by use of the distinction between „simple‟ and „complex‟ social 
relations proposed by Chapman (1990).  The former are inter-personal relations and the latter 
are more developed relations mediated (in the examples given by Chapman) by organisations 
such as companies or trade unions.  The nature of „simple‟ relations is determined solely by 
factors intrinsic to the relationship itself, whereas the nature of „complex‟ relations is 
determined by an externally-determined set of incentives.  While both simple and complex 
relations are conditioned by cultural factors, the latter are also affected by the matrix of 
incentives created by intervening institutions.     
To date, no researchers have attempted to compare and contrast the relative 
explanatory power of the two sets of factors in explaining firms‟ use of specific 
organizational practices at the national level. This is because while measures of cultural 
distance between countries have been available ever since Hofstede‟s classification of 
culture, and especially since it was adapted by Kogut and Singh (1988) to form an index of 
cultural distance that has become “the proxy of choice for national differences” (Xu and 
Shenkar, 2002:608), it is only recently that an equivalent measure has been developed by Hall 
and Gingerich (2004a, 2004b) for institutional distance. That is a measure that is not 
perceptual but which is theoretically grounded (cf. Dikova, 2009) and comprehensive (cf. 
Brouthers, 2002). 
As stated above we compare the explanatory power of these two sets of factors on the 
use of a particular set of HRM practices referred to as “calculative HRM” (Gooderham et al., 
1999). HRM is a labour management paradigm that originated in the USA and reflects the 
predominant approach of companies based there (Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal, 2006). 
Within this paradigm calculative HRM comprises a distinctive set of “individualized” (see 
Brown, Deakin, Nash and Oxenbridge, 2000) practices that includes individualized 
performance measurements and pay. The distinctiveness of calculative HRM as a set of US 
practices has been documented by research that indicates that US multinationals are 
significantly more able to transfer it to their operations in other Anglo-Saxon countries than 
to continental European countries (Gooderham et al., 2006). In terms of Taylor, Beechler and 
Napier‟s (1996) model of HRM transfer this difference in transferability is due to differences 
in cultural and institutional distance. However, determining precisely the relative and joint 
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effects of these two factors has been impeded by the lack of a measure of institutional 
distance. Our research is able to benefit from the introduction of such a measure by Hall and 
Gingerich (2004a). As such we are able to evaluate the joint and relative impact of the two 
sets of factors on the cross-national adoption by firms of a   distinctively US practice.    
In summary we simultaneously employ the Kogut and Singh (1988) composite index 
of cultural distance and  Hall and Gingerich‟s (2004a)  index of institutional distance to 
compare the extent to which the two indices explain the incidence of calculative HRM across 
private-sector firms in 14 countries including the UK, Ireland, Australia, Norway, Denmark, 
Germany and Austria. Appropriate to our task, both indices are designed to measure distance 
from the USA. While our choice of countries is constrained by those encompassed by the 
Hall-Gingerich index our selection nevertheless represents a substantial variety of cultural 
and institutional settings. 
The paper is structured as follows. Initially, we present brief accounts of the concepts 
of cultural and institutional distance. Thereafter we outline the concept of calculative HRM 
and propose two hypotheses. Using separate measures of cultural and institutional distance 
these are then tested and conclusions in regard to the relative explanatory power of cultural 
and institutional distance are drawn.  
 
Cultural distance 
Culture has been defined in different but largely consistent ways (Tsui, Nifadkar and Ou, 
2007).  Hofstede defines it as: „the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes one 
group or category of people from another‟ (Hofstede, 1993:89).  Cultural explanations focus 
on shared cultural values as „the major source of differentiation among national groups‟ (Tsui 
et al., 2007: 430) and culture is often assumed to be the key differentiator of managerial 
behaviour in different national contexts (an assumption criticized by both Parboteeah and 
Cullen, 2003 and Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson,  2006).  Hofstede, Neuijan, Ohayv and 
Sanders (1990: 286) have suggested that “culture has become a fad, among managers, among 
consultants, and among academics” and Hofstede (1980) warns that cultural explanations 
should not be applied to the individual level. However, while researchers employing culture 
are well aware that there is considerable within-country variation on cultural values it is 
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argued that between-country differences are significant for understanding organizational 
outcomes (Kirkman et al., 2006; Reus and Lamont, 2009). Thus cultural interpretations of 
behaviour continue to be advocated as central to the development of management and social 
science (Friedlmeier, Chakkarath and Schwarz, 2005).   
Cultural distance has received a great deal of attention in the international business 
literature (Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Li and Guisinger, 
1991; O'Grady and Lane, 1996; Shenkar, 2001). Our research is based on Hofstede‟s (1983; 
1991) dimensions of national culture and we have adopted Kogut and Singh‟s (1988) index of 
cultural distance. Despite the fact that a number of other researchers have also investigated 
the phenomenon, often from an essentially psychological base (see for example Triandis, 
1994), and the fact that their perspectives are increasingly used to supplement his approach, 
Hofstede is the most widely cited author in the field (Sondergaard, 1994; Yoo and Donthu, 
1998) as demonstrated in a recent extensive survey of 180 articles on culture published in 
leading management journal (Kirkman et.al., 2006).  His pioneering role has been accepted 
by the author of a competing framework Trompenaars (1993, iii) who credits Hofstede “for 
opening management‟s eyes to the importance of the (cross-cultural management) subject”.  
Hofstede‟s (1980; 1983; 1991) empirical framework of national culture is based on a 
survey of 117,000 IBM employees across 50 countries and three multi-country regions. The 
data were collected by using a self-completed questionnaire at two points in time between 
1968 and 1972. The questionnaire focused on work-related values using 32 items to measure 
the importance of various work goals. Using ecological factor analysis; that is, factor analysis 
of country mean scores, three factors were identified which explained 49 percent of the total 
variance. However, one dimension that incorporated power distance and individualism was 
separated into two distinct factors on theoretical grounds. While this initial factor analysis 
was based on 40 countries only, the addition of ten more countries and three regions did not 
significantly change the dimensions (Hofstede, 1983). Hofstede et.al. (1990: 313) later also 
proposed an alternative conceptualization of cultural dimensions at the organizational level, 
but the authors themselves accepted that the sample of twenty case studies was „far too 
limited‟ to claim universality.  Hofstede has consistently refused to apply his concepts to 
levels of analysis other than the national, but Kirkman et.al. (2006: 298) argue that „one 
might reasonably infer‟ that it also applies to smaller groups within nationalities, such as 
organizations and teams.  Some studies have used Hofstede‟s cultural categories to explain 
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specific HR phenomena such as compensation practices at the company level (Schuler and 
Rogovsky, 1998).       
The  validity of Hofstede‟s framework has been subjected to considerable criticism 
(McSweeney, 2002; Gooderham and Nordhaug, 2003) including that its four (later five) 
dimensions  over-simplify culture and that the sampling procedure, limited to single 
multinational corporation, used to generate these dimensions was flawed . However, while 
we share these concerns, equally the application by researchers of Hofstede‟s framework, 
particularly as measured by Kogut and Singh‟s index, continues to be very widespread. 
Kirkman et al. (2006: 286) ascribe this to its “clarity” and “parsimony”.   Nevertheless, of 
particular significance for our investigation, Kirkman et al. (2006: 313) note that the “general 
trend” in the degree of variation in practice explained by studies using Hofstede‟s categories 
is actually small.    
 
Institutional Distance 
Hofstede‟s analysis acknowledges, but does not pursue, the role played by institutional as 
well as cultural factors (Hofstede, 1983).   During recent decades a broad array of research 
focusing on institutional determinants of managerial and organizational practices has been 
published. Although these theoretical perspectives diverge on important dimensions, they  
share the assumption that institutional considerations are more important antecedents of 
management practices than other factors because of the ways that they limit and structure the 
actions and interactions of managers and employees alike. They  emphasise the pressures on 
companies to acquire and maintain legitimacy in relation to the environment and the way that 
interlocking practices can bring benefits in particular systemic contexts (see, e.g. DiMaggio, 
1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). The approach has 
increasingly been applied in comparative empirical studies of the actual application of 
managerial and organizational practices in different countries and regions (Gooderham et al., 
1999; Geppert et al., 2002; Geppert, 2002; Geppert et al., 2003; Sorge, 2004). 
Standard neo-institutional explanations of management practices and strategies predict 
limited diversity among firms that operate in the same industry or organizational field within 
the context of a single society or national economy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Dobbin, 
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Sutton, Meyer and Scott, 1993; Gulati, 1999; Hitt et al., 2004; Peng, 2005; Peng et al., 2005).  
At the core of new institutionalism is an emphasis on the pressures on firms to acquire and 
maintain legitimacy in relation to the environment (see, e.g. DiMaggio, 1983; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). One branch of new institutionalist theory, the 
“Varieties of Capitalism” (VOC) literature takes a firm-centred approach locating the firm in 
its relationships with shareholders, with employees and with other firms (Hall and Soskice, 
2001: 4-6). The approach emphasises the significance and persistence of institutional 
“complementarities” which occur when particular institutional features work together more 
effectively than on their own, encouraging particular combinations of practices. The degree 
of institutional coherence in economies, it has been argued, is important to economic success 
in particular markets (Hall and Gingerich, 2004a). The concept‟s usefulness has been 
elaborated and defended since its initial publication (see for example Crouch, 2005; Streeck 
and Thelen, 2005; Hollingsworth 2006). The concept of institutional distance measures the 
distance between given countries and VOC‟s construct of the “Liberal Market Economy” 
(LME); the alternative is the continental European “Co-ordinated Market Economy” (CME).   
A second branch of this new institutionalist literature – “Business Systems” – pays 
more attention to how collective actors emerge and seek to control resources, in terms of 
work relationships and firm governance (Whitley, 1999). Both branches argue that there is a 
strong interdependence between national systems of co-ordination and firms‟ strategies 
(Whitley, 1999). Despite the possibility of some heterogeneity, there is therefore, a degree of 
uniformity in the mechanisms within each variety of capitalism or business system. These 
mechanisms tend to be “path dependent” or broadly consistent over time (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Whitley, 1999).  “Path-dependence” (c.f. Hollingsworth, 2006) means that while 
national systems may change, actors modify institutions incrementally, leading to change on 
restricted and predictable lines.    
New institutionalist literature assigns a certain, secondary explanatory role to cultural 
factors.  Hall and Soskice (2001) define culture as a set of informal rules, identify it with 
historic inheritances and suggest that it may explain why actors settle on certain equilibria 
within given institutional settings.  The concept played a considerable role in Whitley‟s 
(1992) early explorations of East Asian business systems, where it was closely associated 
with secular historical factors that shaped industrialization.  Cultural factors are distinguished 
from „key social institutions‟ as „more diffuse factors‟ (Whitley, 1992: 13). However, in 
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Whitley‟s later work, culture assumed a less significant role (Whitley, 1999).   Soon after 
their emergence these institutional approaches were subjected to criticisms that they 
constituted an overly functionalist model that exaggerated “path dependency”, and were 
therefore incapable of explaining change (for a recent summary see Deeg and Jackson, 2007).  
According to critics, this meant that they paid too little attention to the ways that institutions 
were capable of re-interpretation and were therefore  adapting to the rapid changes in the 
context of developing pressures from “globalization”.  In response, a theoretical strand has 
been initiated attempting to demonstrate the relatively strong capacity of institutions to adapt 
to meet the needs of key actors (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).  The underlying argument in this 
strand is that numerous modes of incremental institutional change exist that can collectively 
maintain underlying continuities in social settlements whilst transforming the institutions 
themselves.  
In sum, both cultural and institutionalist interpretations propose deeply embedded 
assumptions among actors in different national contexts, even if the former  posit a 
significantly slower rate of change than the latter (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In each of the 
two literatures, the alternative is ascribed a certain, but very restricted role, with  the 
institutionalist literature containing  more reference to culture than vice versa.      
 
Calculative HRM  
Gooderham et al. (2006) have discussed the origins of calculative HRM. In the 1970s, 
American mass production grappled with the persistent effects of increased international 
competition and a more uncertain business environment. New flexible productive techniques 
emerged in the wake of advances in information technology stimulating a shift in competitive 
strategy toward flexible specialization aimed at producing differentiated, high-value-added 
products (Piore and Sabel, 1984). In addition, significant changes to the institutional 
environment occurred in which unions became increasingly marginalized while management 
and shareholders increased their power. In this, as Weinstein and Kochan (1995:27) observe, 
“Government played an important role by weakening its enforcement of labour and 
employment laws and by allowing (some would say encouraging) a harder line by 
management in its resistance to unions”. The result was the demise of the New Deal 
employment relations system and the emergence of a new system of labour management 
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(Weinstein and Kochan, 1995).  This new system stresses the close synchronization of human 
resource policies and activities with the overall business strategy through efficient reward and 
appraisal and employee development monitoring systems, and is essentially indicative of a 
rational, calculative approach (Gooderham et al., 1999). Based on an assumption of a high 
degree of congruence between employer and employee interests, this is a unitarist rather than 
a pluralist or “social partnership” approach (Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994).  It is contrasted with 
“collaborative” or “collectivistic” approaches more commonly found in Europe which, in 
contrast to the “calculative” approach, acknowledges divergent interests within the enterprise 
and an obligation to integrate employee collectives by a range of means including intensive 
communication (Gooderham et.al., 1999; Gospel and Pendleton, 2005).  
As Ferner (2000) and Ferner et al. (2004) argue, the American business system that 
emerged can be understood as a distinctive model of economic organisation within the 
general category of “liberal market economies”. It is characterized by a dominant 
individualist ethos and a strong anti-union mentality. Overall, pay and performance 
management became characterized by the innovative use of performance systems, including 
merit pay and forced performance distributions in employee appraisal processes. Thus the 
new model that emerged was different from that of the New Deal system in that whereas 
formerly wages had been attached to jobs rather than individuals, in the new model a 
pronounced move occurred to tie wages to individual performance and competency through 
individual incentives.  It is in terms of this context, characterized by substantial firm 
autonomy, that Tichy et al.‟s (1984) HRM model is to be understood: that is, as a model that 
emphasizes the systematic use of individual performance appraisals, individual performance-
related rewards and outcomes-monitored training and development. 
    Previous research has demonstrated that calculative HRM has been readily adopted by 
firms in the UK and Australia and significantly less so in continental Western Europe where 
the collaborative approach remains predominant (Gooderham et al., 1999; 2006).    
 
Calculative HRM, Institutions and Culture 
 
In this section, the theoretical connections between the cultural and institutionalist 
interpretive frameworks and calculative HRM are explored and two hypotheses proposed. In 
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addition we first discuss the possible need to unpack these frameworks when testing them 
empirically. Thereafter we address the possibility that the two frameworks may be too 
inextricably intertwined for any real differences to manifest themselves separately in shaping 
calculative HRM is considered.  
 
 The Institutional Framework and Calculative HRM  
Calculative, as opposed to collaborative HRM, emphasizes a “market” rather than a 
“relational approach” to securing employee commitment (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005). In 
the latter, the workplace is seen as a collective enterprise and the workplace as a community 
within which the possibility of conflict is recognized and the degree of “employee-employer 
interdependence” (Whitley, 1999) is raised. In Weberian terms, the attempt is to make it a 
community for itself, based on mutual commitment (Gemeinschaft) rather than in itself, 
based on self-interest (Gesellschaft).  Calculative HRM views any such attempt as 
economically irrational.  It therefore emphasizes external markets, individual roles, incentives 
and accountability.   
In institutional terms, distance from the USA in regulatory terms restricts managerial 
choice in adopting the predominant US paradigm, i.e. calculative HRM. A survey of 
literature on US-based MNCs in Germany clearly demonstrates how most of these companies 
have adapted their HR practices under environmental pressures (Singe and Croucher (2005).  
The environment rather than management custom is however crucial since there is also 
evidence to suggest that German multi-national firms, when „freed‟ from their national 
system do not export it (Meardi and Toth, 2006).  
Legal systems constitute a fundamental building block of the CME-LME distinction 
and clearly play a role in shaping HR practices and especially in restricting the possibilities of 
calculative HRM.  La Porta et al. (1998; 2000) have constructed a scale of legal systems, 
ranking them as to whether they are closer to common law or civil law ideal types. The legal 
system directly affects how other markets, including that for labour, are regulated: where 
shareholder rights are ensured, those of other stakeholders such as employees will be reduced 
(see Botero et al. 2004; Djankov et al., 2003).  Hence, in civil law countries, shareholder 
rights will be stronger, and in common law ones weaker; the converse is true with employee 
rights.  By ensuring that unions have clear rights to participate in industry-level bargaining, 
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civil law regimes affect the companies‟ capacity to determine pay on an individual basis; 
thus, pay may be determined at the industry level as in many continental European CMEs.   
Deakin, Lele and Siems (2007) have further demonstrated the significance of legal 
regimes to the adoption of different types of HR practice. Variable pay is more likely to be 
encountered where owner rights are stronger, i.e. in countries closer to the common law ideal 
(c.f. Botero et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2003).  However, it is also clear that HR practices are 
shaped by institutional factors that, while they may have a legal basis, have also developed 
further, through institutions that shape custom and practice in workplaces.  In CMEs, these 
factors tend to raise what Whitley (1999) describes as “employer-employee 
interdependence”, allowing high levels of delegation to employees.  Levels of training inside 
specific companies need not be high since these are both high on entry to employment and 
the nature of training is more industry than company-specific (Cockrill and Scott, 1997).  
Thus, less incentive exists to monitor the effectiveness of training since the company has to 
make much lower investments in company-specific training than in LMEs.     
Thus we hypothesize that:  
H1: The closer a country is in terms of institutional distance to the USA, the greater the 
tendency for its firms to adopt calculative HRM 
     
The Cultural Framework and Calculative HRM 
The relationship between the four different dimensions that comprise Hofstede‟s 
cultural framework, which comprise the basis of the Kogut-Singh index, and calculative 
HRM is arguably more problematic. Calculative HRM, particularly in terms of individualized 
appraisal and rewards would appear to be congruent with Hosftede‟s Individualism 
dimension. Equally calculative HRM might be less likely to emerge in contexts characterized 
by high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance because greater use of varying rewards might trigger 
uncertainty and therefore resistance. For the two other dimensions the relationship is less 
apparent. Thus while the Power Distance dimension might potentially be associated with a 
less ‟relational‟ view of motivation,  yet there might be most demand for it in the middle of 
the range of Power Distance. This is because very high levels of Power Distance might mean 
that individual pay is simply not needed because of the subordinates‟ high levels of 
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motivation to comply with direction, while very low levels might mean that it would fly in 
the face of egalitarian norms.  In the case of the Masculinity dimension the possible 
relationship becomes even less clear.  
This reasoning would appear to be borne out in terms of empirical research by Schuler 
and Rogovsky (1998). Their cross-national research indicates that while Individualism is 
significantly correlated with firms‟ use of key calculative HRM practices such as pay-for-
performance and focus on individual performance, neither Power Distance or Masculinity is 
associated with these practices. However, as we conjecture, they did find that firms in 
countries with high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance are markedly less inclined to use these 
practices. In other words Schuler and Rogovsky‟s (1998:172) results specifically indicate that 
“individual incentive compensation practices have a better fit in countries with higher levels 
of Individualism” and countries with lower levels of Uncertainty Avoidance. Hofstede‟s other 
dimensions have little or no influence. Although, as Schuler and Rogovsky acknowledge, 
their research failed to control for a range of variables such as firm size, private-public 
ownership, and industry, all of which they concede might explain a certain amount of 
variance in the use of particular HRM practices, Individualism and low levels of Uncertainty 
Avoidance do appear to be related to calculative HRM. Given that the Kogut-Singh index is 
premised on distance from the USA, and given that the USA has an extremely high 
Individualism score combined with a low ranking in the Uncertainty Avodiance dimension 
we propose that:  
H2: The closer a country is in terms of cultural distance to the USA, the greater the tendency 
for its firms to adopt calculative HRM. 
      Before testing our two hypotheses let us address two issues. The first of these is that both 
indexes may need to be “unpacked”. This is particularly the case for the Kogut-Singh index 
which as our discussion above reveals clearly comprises disparate elements. However, 
potentially the same may be the case for the Hall-Gingerich index which also is attempting to 
measure a multifaceted concept.  
The second issue concerns the possibility that the effects of cultural and institutional 
factors on the adoption of calculative HRM are too closely intertwined to be separated.  That 
is that LME nations tend to be more individualistic than CME nations. However, there is a 
persuasive argument suggesting that they may indeed be separable.  By definition, 
13 
 
movements in the two structures operate on completely different timescales; “culture” 
describes a set of norms and values  that change only imperceptibly over very long periods of 
time, whereas institutions impact on management practice as  notions of legitimate behaviour 
that are subject to constant if incremental modification in relation to the environment.  
Streeck and Thelen (2005) for example show how the German welfare system evolved from 
its Bismarckian origins to the late Twentieth Century to provide very different incentives for 
actors in employment relations,  Thus, while German culture remained fairly constant the 
institutions changed their ways of working to provide different incentives to actors.  Thus we 
will proceed on the working assumption that the two factors are in fact separable. 
 
Methodology 
    Data 
To test our hypotheses we have employed data derived from the 1999 Cranet survey 
of HRM in European countries. The 1999 data set was preferred to the more recent 2003 
version since the variables within the earlier version allow for construction of a more 
comprehensive calculative HRM scale. The age of the data set is not a problem since  the 
hypotheses being tested here do not seek to provide evidence of the current penetration of 
calculative HRM and how that has developed over time. Rather this analysis seeks to 
examine the impact of culture and institutions distance on HRM practice. An added 
advantage of our data set is that it was collected at a time close to the data collected for 
construction of the Hall and Gingerich institutional distance index. The validity of the 
culture-focused Kogut and Singh index is much less time sensitive.  
The overall strategy of the survey was to mail appropriately translated questionnaires 
to human resource managers in representative national samples of firms with more than one 
hundred employees. Problems in ensuring that the selection and interpretation of topic areas 
was not biased by one country's approach, as well as problems related to the translation of 
concepts and questions, were largely overcome by close collaboration between business 
schools located in each country (for a detailed description of the Cranet approach, see 
Brewster et al., 1996). Although the response rate for the individual countries is relatively 
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low, mostly between 20 and 35 per cent, analyses of previous Cranet surveys suggest that its 
statistical representativeness has not been impaired (Brewster et al., 1994).  
The total survey data set covers 8,050 firms. Removing those countries not included 
in at least one of the cultural and institutional indices outlined below reduces the sample size 
to 5,970 firms across 14 countries. Omitting those firms where non-responses prevent a full 
set of variables being constructed further reduces the sample to 3,027 firms. Clearly, losing 
almost half of the observations through non-responses is a potential problem to the viability 
of the sample. However a dummy variable adjustment procedure (Cohen & Cohen, 1985) 
was carried out prior to undertaking the empirical analysis outlined below and no significant 
relationships between missingness and the dependent variable were detected. Consequently 
we can be confident that the resultant estimates from the empirical analysis are free from any 
biases generated by these non-responses.  Table 1 summarizes the country distribution of the 
sample for both the original sample and the final working sample. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
   Operationalizations 
As indicated above the Kogut-Singh cultural distance index and the Hall- Gingerich 
institutional index are respectively used to measure cultural and institutional distance. Both 
have been developed with the US serving as a base point.  
 
Cultural distance 
Kogut and Singh (1988) developed a composite index of cultural distance based on 
deviation along the first four dimensions of Hofstede‟s (1980) framework. Many studies have 
subsequently used the Kogut and Singh (1988) formula, or an adapted version, as a measure 
of cultural distance (Agarwal, 1994; Barkema et al., 1996; Benito and Gripsrud, 1992; 
Fletcher and Bohn, 1998; Gomez-Mejia and Palich, 1997; Kale, 1991; Morosini, Shane and 
Singh, 1998; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996). Morosini et al. (1988) identify two main 
advantages of using this composite index. First, it is argued that by using the existing country 
scores the problem of common method variance will be avoided. Second, the composite 
index overcomes the problem of retrospective evaluation. It is evident, therefore, that the 
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composite index is a useful and effective indicator of cultural distance. While our initial 
analysis uses the Kogut-Singh index, we are also mindful that culture might have effects 
which are not captured by distance from the USA. Thus we also carry out a separate analysis 
using the individual values of the culture dimensions. 
 
Institutional distance 
Hall and Gingerich demonstrated on the basis of econometric data that key measures 
of corporate governance and labour relations in an economy can be combined to produce a 
single factor which captures much of the variance of these elements. The index combines 
measures of shareholder power, dispersion of firm control, size of stock market, level and 
degree of wage coordination and labour turnover. All are highly correlated with a single 
factor. The Hall-Gingerich index for the first time provides the opportunity to specify the 
position of a country in terms of a single LME-CME continuum that runs from „0‟ for the 
USA to „1‟ for Austria. In calculating their coordination index they have included a wide 
range of developed countries thereby rendering a “varieties of capitalism approach to 
comparative capitalism pertinent not only to relatively pure types of LMEs or CMEs” (Hall 
and Gingerich, 2004a: 37) but also to the many less pure or more ambiguous forms. With 
coordination conceived as a continuum between “pure LME and “pure” CME the index can 
be used to locate a much greater number of nations vis-à-vis one another than previous “pure-
types” dichotomous approaches had permitted. At the same time, though, the index confirms 
the validity of the basic distinction between LMEs and CMEs. The Hall-Gingerich index has 
two separate components: a corporate governance component (shareholder power, dispersion 
of control, size of stock market); and a labour relations component (coordination in labour 
relations, level of wage coordination, degree of wage coordination, labour turnover).  Since 
the labour relations component of the index has the most salience for HR practices, we focus 
on the labour relations component in the present study. 
 
   Calculative HRM  
Following Gooderham et al (2006) the dependent variable in our analysis, calculative 
HRM, is constructed using the binary responses to core questions relating to HRM policy. 
The calculative approach to managing human resources emphasises individual performance 
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appraisal, individual reward systems, and monitoring of the effects of training. Replicating 
Gooderham et al‟s (2006) nonparametric probalistic Mokken scale for these 14 countries 
produces the results shown below in Table 2. The resultant scale, which models calculative 
HRM as a latent variable measured with error by the ten binary items, achieves the minimum 
acceptance criterion in terms of both scalability and reliability with all of the H-values being 
above 0.3 and Cronbach‟s alpha greater than 0.7 (Gooderham et al., 2006). Therefore 
representing these 10 variables with a single scale is a statistically valid step. The Calculative 
HRM scale is then applied as the dependent variable in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The theoretical underpinning to our analysis suggests that the factors determining a firm‟s 
HRM decisions act at two distinct levels. Whereas the control variables, such as size of the 
firm, its ownership and  the industry in which it operates are at the firm level,  institutional 
and cultural distance  are beyond the scope of the firm and act at a national level upon all 
firms. As a consequence, using a traditional linear regression approach would be flawed for 
several reasons. Most importantly, parameter mis-estimation is likely as the independence 
assumption is violated (Klein and Kozlowski 2000, Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  Moreover, 
lower level variables may not be representative of group level constructs (Goldstein 1995). 
Therefore in this case hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) is applied, to enable the impact of 
those factors acting at the firm level and those operating at the national level to be established 
more robustly.  
The HLM models applied here estimate calculative HRM as a function of variables at 
two distinct levels, level 1 being the firm and level 2 being country. All the level 1 variables 
are entered as group-centered, and in the level 1 model the firm level regression coefficients 
for the ownership dummies as well as union density are allowed to vary by country. Group 
level centering means that level 1 coefficients represent the effects on the dependent variable, 
of variation in level 1 independent variables, relative to their country mean.  The effect is to 
focus the analysis of level 1 variables on the effect of within country between  firm variation. 
The effect of  between country variation in the mean  size of level 1 independent variables is 
partialed out. This is appropriate for our analyses since these country means would act as an 
imperfect proxy for national culture and institutions correlating with and complicating our 
comparison of the (level 2) effects of culture and institutions on calculative HRM. 
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HLM has no direct equivalent of  OLS regression Rsqd. However, following Hunter 
and Schmidt (1990), an index of the effect size based on the t-value of the parameter 
estimates and the degrees of freedom is constructed as: (t
2
/(t
2
 + df))
0.5
 and the relative size of 
each effect is then estimated as; (t
2
/(t
2
 + df))
0.5/∑(t2/(t2 + df))0.5.  
     Control variables 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to establish and compare the impact of 
cultural and institutional distance on the HRM policies and strategies expressed by the extent 
of calculative HRM, as measured by Gooderham et.al.‟s (1999) scale outlined below. 
Calculative HRM is thus the dependent variable.  It is estimated as a function of institutional 
and cultural distance at the country level while controlling for a range of other factors at the 
firm level which are likely to influence the firm‟s HRM approach (Gooderham et al., 1999; 
2006; Fenton-O‟Creevy et al., 2008).  These are firm size, industry, ownership and union 
density. Firm size is measured as the total number of employees. Industry is a set of dummy 
variables identifying the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors with secondary sector being 
used as the reference group. Ownership is a set of dummies for US owned firms, non-US 
owned foreign firms and domestic owned firms with the latter as the reference group. Finally 
union density is measured as the proportion of employees who are trade union members. It is 
often the case that a size variable of this type is skewed by a small number of very large firms 
and the variable is entered as a logarithm to reduce the skewness. In this instance it has not 
been entered in logarithmic form since this means that the coefficient on the size variable is 
more straightforward to interpret. However, in order to ensure the reliability of the results, all 
of the subsequent models have also been estimated with a logarithmic size variable and all of 
our reported findings are consistent using either formulation.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
Tables 3 and 4 display the correlations between both the variables included in our 
hypotheses and the control variables measured, respectively, at the firm and country levels 
TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 below records the composite indices for both cultural and institutional distance, 
covering all of the countries included in this analysis as well as the individual measures 
underpinning the overall indices. 
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  TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Table 6 shows results from a test of two models. We first examine the effect of cultural 
and institutional distance using the Kogut-Singh index as our cultural distance measure and 
the labour relations component of the Hall-Gingerich index as our institutional distance 
measure. Second, since we wished to examine the possibility that the Kogut- Singh index 
masked either contrary effects on different cultural dimensions or cultural effects which are 
not captured by cultural distance from the USA we replaced the Kogut- Singh index by 
separate values for each culture dimension. This revealed that only the effect of Individualism 
achieved significance (at p<0.1, prior to entering Labour relations into the analysis). To give 
the greatest chance of detecting a significant result for culture we therefore dropped all 
culture dimensions except Individualism and entered this together with Labour relations in 
the analysis (Model 2). Indeed it may be noted that entering all culture dimensions and 
Labour Relations simultaneously, does not add any further explanatory power and reduces 
the significance of coefficients due to the reduction in degrees of freedom, since the degrees 
of freedom at country level are determined by number of countries in the analysis not by 
number of firms.  
 If we focus our attention on the Level 1 control variables, the results are in line with 
previous findings (Gooderham, et al., 1999; 2006). Size is important with those firms 
employing more people tending to be more calculative. Union density is also important and a 
greater proportion of trade union members significantly reduces the extent of calculative 
HRM. In addition, ownership has a significant impact. Foreign-owned firms tend to be more 
calculative than domestically owned ones and amongst these firms, the results indicate that 
US owned firms are clearly more calculative than others. 
   TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 Both models tell the same story. The institution measure explains significant country 
level variance in calculative HRM but the culture measure fails to explain any significant 
variance. While a separate analysis entering only culture showed Individualism to achieve 
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marginal significance, the effect of Individualism is completely subsumed once we enter the 
institutional distance (Labour Relations) variable.  
 Thus hypothesis 1 (greater institutional distance from the USA is associated with lower 
calculative HRM) is supported, while hypothesis 2 (greater cultural distance from the USA is 
associated with lower calculative HRM) is rejected.  
  
Conclusions 
 The paper‟s contribution has been to show that institutional distance from the USA is 
more significant than cultural distance in determining the incidence of the LME form of 
labour management, i.e. calculative HRM.  In the process, we also found that the effects of 
the two frameworks are indeed separable.  The consequences for the frames of reference of 
those researchers who rely either solely on cultural analysis or who make only formal 
recognition of the importance of institutions as a sub-set of cultural influences are significant.  
Moreover, while institutional theory has to some extent at least taken account of cultural 
influences, the reverse is much less the case and our findings are therefore rather negative for 
cultural theory. This is significant because cultural discourses have hitherto predominated in 
management studies, while institutional explanations have been relatively marginal.  A 
significant practical consequence of the analysis for management and management training is 
that all aspects of the institutional issue deserve more attention than they currently receive in 
management schools and indeed in the practice of management itself.  There may also be 
wider consequences in terms of the frames of reference adopted by scholars making 
international comparisons. 
 We have not found that cultural differences are of no importance in determining the 
adoption of calculative HRM.  First, it could be argued that even though it is not included in 
the Hall-Gingerich index, culture is subsumed to some extent in the institutional perspective 
(in the form of cultural-cognitive mindset). Second, the limited degrees of freedom at country 
level mean that our study may not have the power to detect modest culture effects. 
Nonetheless if there are national culture effects on calculative HRM the present study 
suggests at the very least that as measured by Hofstede‟s cultural dimensions, they are 
weaker than the effects of national labour relations institutions.   
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 Our results lend some credence to the criticisms of the Hofstede approach made by 
McSweeney (2002) and Gooderham and Nordhaug (2003) in that it has proved impossible to 
detect any clear connection between the scale derived from his framework and calculative 
HRM.  Our findings are also consistent with those of others who have studied the investment 
decisions of US-based companies seeking to invest abroad who are likely to wish to introduce 
calculative HRM.  The studies found that employment relations institutions, although 
subordinate to market size considerations, play a considerable role in these decisions (Cooke, 
1997; Bognanno et.al., 2005).  It may be that these institutions provide more perceptible 
material constraints on managers than the more abstract and diffuse cultural considerations.  
Managers faced with attempting to introduce variable pay may be more aware of the 
considerable tangible difficulties posed by laws and institutions such as unions and works 
councils than of attitudinal issues.  
 A substantive synthesis of the two approaches that seeks to understand the mechanisms 
involved in greater depth is required. This calls for an investigation across a broader range of 
management practices than we have undertaken here; even within HRM, we have 
investigated only one set of practices. Hitherto, cultural and institutional theories have 
operated in intellectual silos that, while formally recognizing the other‟s significance, have 
made no attempt to enter into serious dialogue with each other.  The two discussions continue 
to develop in substantial isolation. Our paper represents the first step towards developing 
such a synthesis and is thus a significant contribution to achieving an adequate holistic 
understanding of the antecedents of firms‟ HRM practices in different national settings.  
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Table 1: Country Distribution of Data Sample 
         Original Sample        Working Sample 
Country Observation
s 
Percentage Observation
s 
Percentage 
UK 1091 18.3% 562 18.6% 
Ireland 446 7.5% 245 8.1% 
Australia 240 4.0% 148 4.9% 
New 
Zealand 
570 9.5% 366 12.1% 
Germany 743 12.4% 384 12.7% 
Denmark 520 8.7% 260 8.6% 
Norway 391 6.5% 154 5.1% 
Austria 230 3.8% 115 3.8% 
Finland 290 4.9% 127 4.2% 
France 400 6.7% 221 7.3% 
Netherlands 234 3.9% 64 2.1% 
Portugal 169 2.8% 103 3.4% 
Spain 294 4.9% 148 4.9% 
Sweden 352 5.9% 130 4.3% 
Total 5970 100% 3027 100% 
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Table 2: Mokken Scale of Calculative HRM 
 
  Mean Hwgt Corr. 
Scale Overall calculative scale, 10 items  0.46 0.30 
 (Cronbach's alpha = 0.81)    
Item 1 Monitoring of training effectiveness 0.58 0.39 0.44 
Item 2 Formal evaluation of training 0.53 0.38 0.44 
Item 3 Performance appraisals: managers 0.7 0.54 0.54 
Item 4 Performance appraisals: professionals 0.68 0.58 0.60 
Item 5 Performance appraisals: clerical 0.63 0.54 0.58 
Item 6 Performance appraisals: manual 0.47 0.32 0.37 
Item 7 Merit pay: managers 0.43 0.39 0.46 
Item 8 Merit pay: professionals 0.42 0.48 0.55 
Item 9 Merit pay: clerical 0.35 0.51 0.53 
Item 10 Merit pay: manual 0.26 0.35 0.30 
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Table 3: Firm level correlation matrix 
 
Calculative 
HRM 
Total 
Employees 
Union 
Density 
US 
Owned 
non-US 
Owned 
Domestically 
Owned Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Calculative HRM          
Total Employees 0.04         
Union Density -0.24 -0.01        
US Owned 0.150 -0.01 -0.09       
non-US Owned 0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.20      
Domestically 
Owned -0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.49 -0.76     
Primary 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.07    
Secondary -0.07 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.26   
Tertiary 0.06 -0.01 -0.22 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.17 -0.91  
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Table 4: Country level correlation matrix 
 
Power 
Distance 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance Masculinity Individualism 
K-S 
Index 
Labour 
Relations 
Power Distance       
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 0.70      
Masculinity -0.14 0.11     
Individualism -0.34 -0.72 0.17    
K-S Index 0.45 0.68 -0.35 -0.92   
Labour Relations -0.05 0.38 -0.28 -0.59 0.48  
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Table 5: Measures of culture and institutions 
  
  Culture 
        
Cultural Distance 
from USA        Institutional Distance from USA 
Country 
Power  
Distance   
Uncertainty  
Avoidance  Masculinity Individualism K-S Index Labour Relations 
Corporate  
Governance H-G Index 
USA 40 46 62 91 0 0 0 0 
UK 35 35 66 89 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.07 
Ireland 28 35 68 70 0.61 0.28 0.35 0.29 
Australia 36 51 61 90 0.03 0.29 0.47 0.36 
New Zealand 22 49 58 79 0.47 0.09 0.27 0.21 
Germany 35 65 66 67 0.72 0.92 0.95 0.95 
Denmark 18 23 16 74 1.86 0.58 0.65 0.7 
Norway 31 50 8 69 1.72 0.81 0.74 0.76 
Austria 11 70 79 55 2.4 1 1 1 
Finland 33 59 26 63 1.36 0.66 0.71 0.72 
France 68 86 43 71 2.06 0.6 0.82 0.69 
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Netherlands 38 53 14 80 1.08 0.53 0.74 0.66 
Portugal 63 104 31 27 6.22 0.62 0.85 0.72 
Spain 57 86 42 51 2.66 0.54 0.77 0.57 
Sweden 31 29 5 71 1.91 0.59 0.71 0.69 
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Table 6: Estimated multi-level models 
      Model 1     Effects      Model  2     Effects 
 Coeff T-ratio Size % Coeff T-ratio Size % 
Intercept 61.75 10.4** 0.95 22% 70.39 4.0** 0.76 18% 
L1 variables               
No. employees (000s) 0.01 2.3* 0.04 1% 0.01 2.3* 0.04 1% 
Union density -0.09 -4.9** 0.82 19% -0.09 -5.0** 0.82 20% 
US owned 12.98 8.1** 0.92 21% 12.98 8.1** 0.92 22% 
Non US owned
a 6.53 5.5** 0.85 20% 6.53 5.5** 0.85 20% 
Primary
b 4.57 1.9ǂ 0.03 1% 4.57 1.9ǂ 0.03 1% 
Tertiary 2.00 1.9ǂ 0.03 1% 2.00 1.9ǂ 0.03 1% 
L2 variables               
Individualism        -0.1 -0.5 0.14 3% 
Kogut and Singh Index 0.59 0.3 0.09 2%        
Labour Relations -22.20 -2.3* 0.55 3% -23.9 -2.2* 0.54 13% 
Level 1 variance explained 0.01   4.28   0.023   4.13  
Level 2 variance explained 0.72       0.599       
No. of observations 3027       3027       
Degrees of freedom – level 1 3018     3018     
Degrees of freedom – level 2 12       12       
ǂ, * and ** denote significance at the p<0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
a. Reference category is domestically owned.  
b. Reference category is Secondary 
